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Institutional failures, bank rescues, prudential supervision and financial-crime enforcement.
Startup cash fueled Silicon Valley Bank’s growth. Falling bond values and a rush of withdrawals brought it down in March 2023, leaving regulators to protect deposits and sell the banking business.
Three U.S. banks failed between March and May 2023. Their customers, assets and rescue attempts differed, but rapid withdrawals exposed weaknesses that had built up before the crisis. A federal judge ruled on August 28, 2026 that SVB’s former parent company cannot recover a $1.71 billion claim against the FDIC.
Lehman’s September 2008 bankruptcy followed mounting property losses, shrinking access to cash and a failed rescue weekend. Barclays and Nomura took over businesses, while the Repo 105 investigation and separate creditor proceedings continued long after the collapse.
California closed Nano Banc on September 25, 2026. Sunwest took over substantially all deposits and selected assets, while the FDIC retained other assets and estimated an initial $114 million insurance-fund cost.
BNP Paribas admitted moving money for sanctioned entities through the U.S. financial system. The case brought a criminal sentence, overlapping penalties and global compliance requirements that the Federal Reserve ended in 2024.
U.S. Bank capped alerts from its monitoring system and later found thousands of reports it had missed. Its 2018 resolution included admissions and $613 million in nonduplicative monetary obligations; the related proceedings ended on separate timetables.
A dedicated case study of Credit Suisse’s business model, governance failures, two withdrawal waves, UBS acquisition, public liquidity support and divergent creditor outcomes, with a qualified AT1 litigation status check.
A 2026 Federal Reserve agreement required SouthPoint Bancshares to plan support for its Alabama bank, following a separate bank-level order and reported financial losses.
A joint FDIC and North Dakota order required Choice Financial Group to strengthen customer checks and monitoring across third-party programs, review past activity, and repair gaps in the data used to detect suspicious transactions.
Flint’s 2014 switch to river water went ahead without corrosion control. The return to Detroit water was only the start of years of pipe replacement, public spending and litigation, with compensation still being processed in 2026.
A proposed investment drew a small Utah bank into online-poker payment processing. SunFirst’s 2011 closure, later criminal sentences and the end of its receivership were separate stages of the case.
Banamex USA processed millions of transfers but investigated very few of its own alerts. Regulatory penalties, an admitted criminal-compliance failure and the surrender of its banking charter followed.
The OCC’s January 2024 order covered anti-money-laundering controls, fintech relationships and the bank’s financial plans. The order ended November 13, 2025, after Blue Ridge had exited its depository banking-as-a-service business.
The OCC’s 2020 action traced weaknesses from cloud risk assessment through audit and board oversight. The two banks neither admitted nor denied its findings. The corrective order ended in August 2022, separately from the monetary penalty.
The OCC’s 2020 order led to another penalty and tighter resource controls in 2024. A December 2025 termination removed the amendment, without terminating the original order.
The OCC’s April 2026 order described weaknesses in how CFSB understood customers and investigated payment activity, including alerts that automation closed too readily.
A wholesale funding run pushed Continental Illinois into an extraordinary rescue in 1984. Regulators kept the bank open, protected depositors and general creditors, replaced management and took rights to a controlling ownership stake.
The FDIC and Mississippi regulators required the Collins bank to revise its anti-money-laundering program after a 2025 examination. The consent agreement was dated March 25, 2026; the order took effect March 26.
Danske Bank admitted deceiving U.S. banks about its Estonian branch to keep dollar payments flowing. Its 2022 guilty plea led to a coordinated financial resolution and three years of probation, which the bank said ended in December 2025.
New York’s 2020 order covered Jeffrey Epstein and two foreign-bank relationships. It described information and monitoring failures, imposed one combined penalty and used an existing monitor. Later civil and federal proceedings had different outcomes.
Federal authorities pursued First Bank of Delaware over payment-processor oversight and allegedly fraudulent consumer withdrawals. The 2012 resolution required one shared $15 million payment as the bank left the business.
First Republic’s affluent clients and long-term mortgages helped build a large banking franchise. When deposits fled in 2023, emergency borrowing and industry support failed to restore it, ending in a receiver-arranged sale to JPMorgan.
HSBC’s $1.921 billion resolution addressed anti-money-laundering failures and sanctions violations. The criminal charges were dismissed in 2017, while a related Federal Reserve order remained in place until August 2022.
The Federal Reserve ended its 2024 order against Jiko Group in June 2026. The original action focused on the parent’s financial condition, cash flow and ability to support its bank subsidiary.
Signature’s business deposits funded commercial lending and a growing payments network. In March 2023, a rapid run exposed weaknesses in emergency funding, followed by a bridge bank, a partial sale and years of asset recovery.
The FDIC and Ohio regulators required Sutton to strengthen anti-money-laundering controls, review prepaid-card customer identification dating to July 2020, and make third-party responsibilities visible to its board.
TSB moved its customer data to a new platform in April 2018, but technical failures disrupted access to banking services. UK regulators later imposed £48.65 million in fines over planning, testing and outsourcing failures.
UBS admitted helping U.S. taxpayers hide accounts and agreed to payments, disclosures and an exit from the undeclared-account business. Its deferred criminal charges were dismissed in October 2010; the related IRS summons was withdrawn the following month.
A 2023 examination found major oversight and anti-money-laundering weaknesses at the Dallas bank. A joint order required changes in 2024; the Federal Reserve announced its termination in September 2026.
The OCC replaced two USAA Federal Savings Bank orders in December 2024 because specified requirements remained unmet. The new action tied improvements in customer protection, technology and oversight to restrictions on certain new business.
Washington Mutual’s banking business changed hands overnight in September 2008. Its depositors kept access to their money, while separate bank and holding-company estates dealt with investor claims for years.
Unauthorized accounts led to consumer penalties, corporate admissions and an investor settlement. A broader Federal Reserve order restricted Wells Fargo’s growth until 2025 and ended in March 2026.
How a retreat in crypto deposits led to securities sales, a supervised bank wind-down and full depositor repayment, followed by a separate parent-company reorganization.
Examinations of Evolve’s fintech-partnership business led to a joint June 2024 order covering customer records, consumer compliance and bank-wide risk. The Fed expressly separated it from the Synapse bankruptcy.
Years of weak transaction monitoring culminated in criminal guilty pleas and an OCC growth restriction in October 2024. The order constrains two U.S. banks while remediation remains subject to regulatory review.
Bear Stearns’ dependence on short-term funding turned doubts about mortgage exposures into an immediate cash crisis. Its resolution combined a JPMorgan Chase acquisition with public lending whose eventual recovery was very different from the risk assumed in March 2008.
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